Introduction
Over the last two decades, innovative development of knowledge and technology is the key for sustainable growth of enterprises under the environment of changing competition, especially for high-tech industries. Many manufacturing activities could be considered high-technology, and R&D intensity activity is the most popular indicator based on the design of corporate competition strategy. Apart from R&D intensity, we also test capital intensity as other industry-specific characteristic of firms in high-tech industries. Considering the impact of technology intensities and industries, we investigated the direct relationship between corporate ownership and information transparency in Taiwan. Using a sample of evaluated, listed firms from 2005 to 2012, our sample was further partitioned based on the OECD industry classification according to relative R&D performance.
Two questions in this study are provided as follows: Does high technology mean high transparency? Does high power inside a firm tend to high opacity? It is an intriguing issue in corporate governance. Also, we wondered whether corporate inside ownership is influential in dealing with this sensitive issue at high-tech firms. Our approach to answering these questions began by addressing the effects of technology industries and intensities on information transparency, then, we further considered the influence of firm insiders" ownership on the effects.
Using univariate analysis, we find that information transparency in high-tech industries is higher than that of other industries. Since both capital intensity and R&D intensity have relative benefits of operational strategies and they are distinctive in statistics, they can help us analyze the effect of technology level on information transparency. Using correlation analysis, we find that the main firm-specific factors and technology intensities and industries have a significant positive relationship with information transparency. As expected, both insiders" shareholdings and ownership internalization are significantly, negatively associated with information transparency. We further implement multivariate regressions at different levels that controls the factors expected to explain the effects on information transparency.
In this study, there are three findings: first, we find that the higher the technology intensities and industries are, the higher the information transparency is. Second, relative to firms in traditional industries, R&D intensity has a negative effect on information transparency for firms of medium transparency grade but not for firms of higher transparency grade and of "Best voluntary disclosure" in high-tech industries. Third, controlling firm-specific characteristics, we examine whether increase in insiders" shareholdings has a higher impact on information transparency for the firms with higher technology intensities. We find that when high-tech firms experience increase in insiders" shareholdings, their information transparency significantly decreases. We also find that when traditional firms with high R&D intensity experience increase in insiders" shareholdings, their information transparency are significantly enhanced. This study"s contribution to the literature is in threefold. First, this paper disentangles the inconsistent effects of prior researches about the proprietary information effect, which will be discussed later, on corporate transparency at different levels. No precise explanation has been found so far. Second, extant literatures on information transparency rarely discuss industry-specific variables, technology intensities, and corporate ownership together. We base our research on technology intensities and technology industry classification to group all officially-evaluated firms for in-depth analysis. Third, this is the first study to integrate the official information transparency evaluation ranking, the OECD industry classifications and measurements together, based on the OECD principles of corporate governance and the related assumptions on corporate governance. We believe that official data and measurement can provide convincing results.
We expect our research to help investors and creditors inspect corporate information, and authorities supervise security markets and protect investors" right. Except introduction, the rest of our paper includes research background and hypothesis development in the second section; research design in the third section; empirical results in the fourth and conclusion in the final section.
Background and Hypothesis

Information Transparency and Technology Intensities
Professional investors are likely to have better access to alternative information channels such as social networks and local contacts. But, most investors have a big challenge to obtain undisclosed information. No mature regulation on business information disclosure involves a high moral risk for investors. The "lemon problem" of information disclosure is a result of conflicts of interest and asymmetry information between internal managers and external investors. If it cannot be well treated, it might make the capital market mechanism fail (Akerlof, 1970) .
Isolating two distinct factors, Bushman et al., (2004) find that the governance transparency factor is primarily related to a country's legal/judicial regime, whereas the financial transparency factor is primarily related to political economy. Hence, comprehensive official evaluation of important public information could be the most direct evidence of disclosure level and the information transparency. In 2002, Taiwan"s regulator launched "Information Disclosure and Transparency Rankings System" (hereafter, IDTRS) to evaluate information transparency of all qualified listed firms in Taiwan since 2003. They conduct the system annually and announce an evaluation result to the public in the following year. The metrics for IDTRS evaluation are established in five categories of indicators, of which about forty percent are designed for voluntary disclosure. The IDTRS additionally announce the firms conducting "Best voluntary disclosure", and award the firms showing "Most improvement" in disclosure practice. The IDTRS annual report helps all stakeholders understand and monitor evaluated firms" corporate governance. The related statistics about the IDTRS results are as shown in Table 1 .
Some firm managers may prefer R&D projects to direct the purchase of precision instruments for many reasons: On the signalling role, firms" R&D activities are viewed as a signal to contribute to firm"s current or future earnings performance, an example of this is displayed by Ahmad and Falk (2006) to provide more value-relevant information which has a positive relationship with stock price/return (Oswald and Zarowin, 2007) ; to reduce information asymmetry and develop their trading partnership. In the opportunistic role, managers may use discretionary R&D to smooth income (Guidara et al., 2014) ; to meet debt covenants; to meet or beat earnings threshold (Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011) .
In comparison, capital intensity represents an alternative strategy for technology development, in our analysis. Firm"s investments in precision instrument or equipment can acquire essential knowledge and technology. Innovative high-tech knowledge and technology are normally embedded in new productive assets. Firms have to make substitutions, upgrade, or betterment for their productive assets once innovative products or technologies are released. Some firms specialize in R&D activities, some depend more on patents or innovative precision instrument. Moreover, we categorized the technology level in industries according to the OECD industry classification. Based on R&D intensities, the OECD classifies manufacturing industries into four categories: high-tech, medium-high tech, Medium-low-and Low-technology industries 1 .
Hypothesis Development
A considerable proportion of researches examine the effect of corporate governance on efficient markets and economic consequences, such as cost of capital (e.g. Lambert et al., 2007) and corporate performance (Eng and Mak, 2003; Cormier, et al., 2009; Liu, et al., 2014) . Because corporate governance has been described as the efficient structure used to enhance information disclosure, the positive relations between corporate governance and efficient markets, and economic consequences becomes a basic assumption.
The reasons why we use the two characteristics of high-tech industries to analyze the factors of information transparency are mainly based on previous research work on public disclosure of new information. Diamond (1985) proposes the optimal release of information. His assumption indicates that public information disclosure of firms may have demonstrated a negative effect on the welfare of all shareholders, due to an adverse risk-sharing effect, or have a positive effect, due to explicit cost saving. Forker (1992) further theoretically develops a model of the optimal disclosure decision in terms of managerial incentives and the impact of corporate governance structures.
In general, firms with a high technology need to sustain substantial capital budgeting and long-term financing. However, capital increase from external financing must offer "the Prospectus" 2 in which some relevant information must be disclosed to convince potential investors. The specific laws for the firms to apply for investment tax credits stringently require more statements presented to the competent authority and related information disclosed to the public. In the reality of business, firms may voluntarily expose useful public information for economic interests at the corporation"s website (Debreceny et al., 2003) , in financial forecasts (Yu et al., 2010) and through other channels. Healy and palepu (2001) point out that one of the three purposes why firms volunteer their information is to gain more media coverage. The management relations hypothesis argues that analysts intentionally bias their forecasts to curry favor with management in order to gain access to management information (Francis et al., 1994) , which give firms with high technology an incentive to disclose more private information for favorable analyst coverage. Barth et al. (2001) find that analyst coverage is significantly greater for firms with larger R&D and advertising expenses relative to their industry, and for firms in industries with larger R&D expense. Also, high-tech firms equipped with the higher operational capability and information facilities, especially for website (Chen et al., 2006) or electronic data processing systems, often have better communications with the public than other industries (Cooke, 1991) .
Empirically, in a trend analysis of 22 computer manufacturing firms, Graves (1988) illustrates the purported detrimental effect of institutional stock ownership on corporate R&D spending. Cooke (1991 Cooke ( , 1992 indicates that manufacturing corporations disclose significantly more information than other types of Japanese corporations. Firm size, listing status and interaction between industry type and quotation status are also find to be significant. In addition, the leading companies of an industry with a significant higher level of information disclosure will motivate the other firms to enhance their information disclosure. Meek et al. (1995) examine factors influencing the voluntary disclosures from U.S., U.K. and other European companies. They find that firm size, country/region, listing status, and industry are the most important factors explaining voluntary disclosures. Botosan (1997) indicates that high voluntary disclosure level is associated with a lower cost of equity capital, which is different among industries. Yeh (2002) investigates firm"s proprietary website pages and find that more than 80% of the listed companies have their own pages. In addition, firms in electronic industries in Taiwan make better information disclosure than those of other industries.
However, even if there are many past researches on disclosure level and information transparency, they analyze specific industries and ignore the effect of technology intensities and industries on disclosure level. Based on theoretical inferences and prior empirical findings, considering technology levels among industries are different, we assume their effects on information transparency are also different. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1A: Firms in high-tech industries have higher information transparency than firms in the other industries.
According to Jensen and Meckling (1992) , the firms with higher technologies have higher levels of private proprietary knowledge, and therefore a more rigorous inside control system is required to resolve the assignment of the alienable property rights. Fan and Wong (2002) mention that opacity is always a good protective strategy because it prevents leakage of firm"s proprietary information about the firms" political rent-seeking activities to competitors and allows firms to avoid unwanted political or social scrutiny.
Relating to firm"s proprietary information and specific human capital effect, we posit that high-tech firm"s high knowledge and technology may inversely affect firm"s information transparency. Balancing all the available arguments, we predict a negative relationship between technology intensities and corporate transparency for firms in high-tech industries, relative to the other industries. We intend to fill the gap by examining the difference between industry level as posited in H1 and firm level as discussed in this subsection. Therefore, we tested the following hypothesis:
H1B: When higher technology intensities exist, high-tech firms have lower information transparency than the non-high-tech firms.
According to the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, the higher shareholdings firm"s management has, the less resource is wasted because personal interests can be aligned with corporate performance. In a similar vein, ownership concentration has an incentive alignment effect: increasing an equity ownership by firm manager beyond the minimum level needed for effective control may increase corporate performance because it means better alignment of the monetary incentives between the manager and other equity owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gomes, 2000) . They essentially say that representative faithfulness of firm information is managers" discretionary accounting choices triggered by their opportunistic motives.
The counter-arguments suggest that firm manager"s shareholdings are negatively correlated with the company"s performance. Increasing equity ownership by the manager may entrench managers and decrease financial performance because powerful managers with large ownership stakes do not have to consider other stakeholders interest. They may no longer intend to maximize profit but get more utilities from maximizing market share or technological leadership etc (Morck et al., 1988) . However, we cannot know whether they maximize market share and technological leadership at the expense of earnings informativeness. Therefore, we extend to consider the adverse impact of the pursuit of technological leadership on corporate information transparency. In the same vein, firms in high-tech industries with specific human capital tend to concentrate their ownership and decision rights on the individuals who possess the specific knowledge (Bushman et al., 2003) . Forker (1992) provides evidence supporting the view that a threat to monitoring quality exists where the roles of chief executive and chairman are combined. Fan and Wong (2002) indicate that in order to protect firm"s private proprietary knowledge and information, the firm with concentrating ownership will have higher intention to avoid the information of firm"s advantages leaking to their opponents, and larger capability of mitigating the company's information transparency to the public. Therefore, considering stronger information effect of high technology intensities and industries (as posited in H1) and the argument that higher concentrated insiders" shareholdings are associated with low earnings informativeness, we expect a negative effect of the interaction between the two factors on information transparency. Morck (1988; 1996) argues that closely-held firms prefer operating in secret in order to discourage entry by competitors, and highly concentrated ownership in order to reduce information flows to the public. When firm"s managerial ownership is between 5% and 30%, characterized by a separation of ownership and control, they create agency conflicts between controlling owners and external investors. Claessens et al. (2002) indicate that Singapore and Taiwan show a negative relationship between ownership rights and firm valuation, which is consistent with the empirical findings of Fan et al., (2002) : the effect of voting right on earnings informativeness is significant and negative. Leuz et al. (2003) examine the earnings management across 31 countries and document that Taiwan is one of the countries having the most severe earnings management. Based on prior studies and conforming to the situation of Taiwan, we moved to hypothesis 2 as follows:
H2: Higher technology intensities may increase insiders' shareholdings which may inhibit information transparency in high-tech firms than in non-high-tech firms.
Research Design
Sample Collection and Classification
The sample is obtained from the IDTRS annual evaluation reports for dependent variables and the "Taiwan Economic Journal database" (TEJ) for all independent variables. We collect a preliminary sample of all 9,200 evaluated firm-year observations. After 219 financial institutions (with unique nature and without R&D data) are eliminated and 144 inappropriate observations (with missing data or unusual condition) are removed, our full sample consists of 8,837 firm-year observations (including 1,391 firms). Because simple dichotomy method of more and less transparent is used in pre-2005 years, the data is rough and has no scaling range. Hence, we can only integrate the observations from 2005 to 2012. Year 2012 is the first year before the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in Taiwan.
In order to mitigate the influence of outliers, we winsorize all of the scaled financial independent variables (R&D, CAP, Turnover, RET, RETVar, Leverage, Profit) at the top and bottom 0.1% of their respective distributions. After deleting the inadequate sample (i.e. without prior-year data; unchanged in transparency grade), the remaining 2,685 firm-year observations are included in our subsample. The upper part of table 1 indicates that high-tech industries apparently have the highest proportion of (33.7%) transparency grade A and A+, the lowest grade C and C-(11.3%), but only traditional firms have a higher proportion of "Best voluntary disclosure" (36.4%) than that of its sample size (30.88%). We integrate correlation analysis of the two technology intensities into industry sample distribution. In the lower part, we find that high-tech firms are highly correlated with technology intensity, especially for R&D intensity. Traditional firms have lowest R&D intensity and medium-high tech firms have lower capital intensity, suggesting different strategies for technology competition in different industries. Accordingly, R&D intensity is an appropriate indicator for specific characteristics of high-tech industries than capital intensity.
The Measure of Variables
Based on the OECD principles of Corporate Governance, we first include information environmental control variables (Patton et al., 1997; Ahmed et al., 1999) as follows: (1) MVE: controlling firm size, equal to the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of sample year; (2) Employee: equal to natural logarithm of annual number of employees of listed companies; (3) BigN: indicating whether the firm is audited by a Big-five, equal to 1 if yes, or 0 otherwise; (4) Turnover: indicating trading environment, equal to annual share trading volume divided by shares outstanding; (5) Market: indicating listing status and visibility, equal to 1 if firms are listed on a major stock market, the TWSE, or 0 in the GSTM; (6) Visibility: denoting global visibility, equal to 1 for firms listed in Morgan Stanley World Index (MSCI), or raising funds in foreign capital markets (i.e. GDR and ADR). The variables controlling firm-specific financial characteristics that may impact the disclosure level include (1) Leverage: equal to ratio of debt to total assets; (2) RET: representing market stock returns over the fiscal year; (3) RETVar: capturing volatility of stock return, equal to annual stock returns rate variance; (4) Profit: capturing profitability, equal to ratio of prior-three-year average net profit margin from sales. (5) DYear: representing control for year fixed-effects.
For simplifying our regression analysis, we regroup our samples by grades, namely Grade A (A+ and A), Grade B (B), Grade C (C and C-; used as the reference group for subsequent logit tests), to obtain approximate sample size. We also categorize the firm-year of "Best voluntary disclosure" as "Best" for our additional tests. In common practice, R&D intensity (variable "R&D") is measured as the ratio of annual R&D expenditure to net operating income 3 (Romer et. al., 1993) . Keep up with U.S. accounting standard, clear-cut in measuring R&D and capital intensities in Taiwan 4 help with our methodology. In addition, we measure capital intensity (variable "CAP") as ratio of year-end productive assets to year net operating revenue. The productive assets only include two TEJ database terms: "Machinery, Instrument and Equipment", and "Intangible Assets" (Ariff, et al., 2014 (1) CV 6 is equal to 1 if the firm have a situation of the divergence between the controlling owner"s cash flow rights and voting rights, or 0 otherwise; (2) Collateral 7 is an aggregate stock collateral percentage of board of directors and supervisors, which also denotes agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors; (3) Internal 8 is the number of internal positions held by inside controlling group and duality of chairman of the board and chief executive officer.
We test the lead-lag relation between change in insiders" shareholdings "△Insider" and change in transparency grade "Upgrade" 9 in an attempt to examine the relationship between insiders" intention and information transparency. To simplify our regression analysis, we give up the poor-effect indicator, capital intensity. Besides, to resolve multi-collinearity problems which emerge as interacting joint variable "R&D*Hightech" with other independent variables, we adopt a cross-industry regression model for comparison when considering R&D intensity. The joint effect of "R&D" and "△insider" on information transparency is estimated in the coefficient β 3 . Next, we test the upgrade on information transparency on R&D intensity and changed insiders" percentage ownership. We use the following pooled logistic regression model:
Upgrade t = β 0 +β 1 (R&D t ) +β 2 (△Insider t ) +β 3 (R&D t )*(△Insider t ) +β 4 (△MVE t ) +β 5 (△Turnover t ) +β 6 (△Leverage t ) +β 7 (△RET t ) +β 8 (△RETVar t ) +β 9 (△Profit t ) +β 10 (△CV t ) +β 11 (△Collateral t ) +β 12 (△Internal t ) +Σγ j (Grade t-1 ) +Σδ k (DYear t )... (2)
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
According to official reports, every grade has its clear score range. For univariate statistics analysis, subject to the content of retrieved data, we transfer each grade into its median interval scale as stated in Table 1 . We use each grade"s median as the dependent variable for the analysis in table 1, 2, and 3. Table 2 states the descriptive statistics and table 3 provides the correlation analysis. Panel A of table 2 presents that the mean transparency grade is only 58, the median 55 (all equal to Grade B), and the standard deviation 8.925, which shows narrowly dispersed, but on average a lower transparency among the evaluated firms; most of the firms engage the Big-five auditor and about half of them ever participate in overseas financing.
The mean (median) R&D intensity is 3.51% (1.21%). R&D has wide variation (9.67%). About 20% of firms have no R&D expenditure. The mean (median) capital intensity is 42% (about 20%) and the standard deviation is 62.15%. But only 4% of firms have a capital intensity of zero. The result shows that the key attributes of these two intensities are different. The highest rate of the insiders" shareholdings is 99.15%, after removing the overlap of all insiders" shareholding; the average is 27.35%, indicating a significant influence. The mean (median) of "Internal" is 2.25 (2), revealing that firm insiders occupy nearly half of internal key positions.
Panel A of table 3 reports that large-sized firms have higher information transparency, and the Big-five auditors enhance credibility of accounting numbers. As expected, "Visibility", "Turnover", "RET" and "Profit" are positively correlated with "Grade"; "Leverage" and "RETVar' are all negatively correlated with "Grade". Both "R&D" and "CAP" have positive correlations with "Grade". Panel B indicates that 'Hightech" has a significantly positive correlation with "Grade", its coefficient of 0.088 is greater than that of medium and traditional, -0.035 and -0.066. Therefore, the hypothesis H1A holds. It also has positive correlation with "R&D" and "CAP', but not for the other industries. "Insider" and "Internal" are, as expected, significantly negative, but "Collateral" is insignificantly negative, correlated with "Grade". Generally speaking, the directions of correlation coefficients are consistent with that in prior researches. First, in panel A of table 4, column (A) shows that a significantly positive coefficient of 0.686 (β 2 ) on "Hightech", which is greater than a positive coefficient of 0.391 (β 4 ) on "Medium". Column (B) and (C) also show significantly positive coefficients of "Hightech", and greater than "Medium", suggesting that industries with higher technology have higher information transparency. The results support the hypothesis H1A and are consistent with the findings of prior researches: there is a higher disclosure level in manufacturing industries, relative to non-manufacturing; and in electric industries relative to non-electric industries. Second, column (B) indicates that the coefficients on "R&D*Hightech" (β 3 ) are significant -0.072 and on "R&D*Medium" (β 5 ) is marginally significant -0.067, suggesting a more negative effect of R&D intensity on information transparency at firms in high-tech than firms in the other two industries. The results support the hypothesis H1B. However, the effect does not appear in columns (A) and (C), suggesting that firms with lower information transparency are negatively affected more by R&D intensity than firms with higher information transparency.
Empirical Results
The Impact of R&D Intensity
Third, we also regress on technology intensities and industries with the same control variables as Eq. (1). Column (C) in panel A of table 4 presents the result, which is consistent with the regression result in column (A). We also find that firms with high R&D intensity in both industries are insignificantly associated with information transparency (β 3 =0.139; β 5 =0.123). We explain that most firms in the groups of Grade A and "Best voluntary disclosure" have robust management systems which can sustain a high level of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the hypothesis H1B is partially supported. 
The Impact of Capital Intensity
Panel B of table 4 reports the same regression analysis with regard to effect of capital intensity. First, the coefficients on "hightech" of column (A) and (B) are 0.757 and 0.871 (β 2 ), and are significantly positive and greater than the coefficient on "Medium", 0.738 and 0.462 (β 4 ), suggesting that industries with higher technology have higher information transparency. Therefore, the hypothesis H1A is supported. 0.263 (0.381) *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively Second, the significantly negative coefficients of -1.484 (β 5 ) in column (A) and -0.446 (β 5 ) in column (B) represent a negative effect on information transparency at firms in medium high-tech industries, relative to firms in traditional industries; however, the insignificantly negative coefficients of -0.053 (β 3 ) in column (A) and 0.155 (β 3 ) in column (B), suggesting that a negative effect of capital intensity on information transparency at firms in medium-high tech industries is greater than at firms in high-tech industries. 180 (0.208) 0.265 (0.384) *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively Third, column (C) reports similar results to that in column (A). We find that the coefficient on "CAP*Medium" is significant -2.068 (β 5 ), but not for "Hightech", -0.128 (β 3 ). Therefore, the hypothesis H1B is not supported. Our explanation is that most firms in high-tech industries are the market focus of concerns among investors. It is difficult for them to inhibit their information transparency. Therefore, the proprietary information effect on high-tech firms seems not as significant as the other firms. Overall, our results are consistent with the findings of prior researches on specific industries" information transparency. 
The Impact of Change on Insiders' Shareholdings
Based on the above results, we find that capital intensity seems not be an adequate indicator for high-tech industries as R&D intensity. In table 5, our second multivariate analysis models the impact of R&D intensity and change in insiders" shareholdings on information transparency, column (2) reports that the coefficient (β 3 ) on interaction term is insignificant -0.007 in high-tech industries, but significant 0.92 in traditional industries in column (4). However, compared with the coefficients of three industries in column (2) to (4), only high-tech industries have a negative coefficient of -0.007 (β 3 ), which is apparently smaller than the other two industries. Based on the apparent difference of the coefficients of "R&D*△Insider" (β 3 ) between traditional and high-tech industries, the hypothesis H2 partially holds. The coefficient of change in insiders" holdings (β 2 ) of column (2) are significant -0.782 but insignificant at the other columns, suggesting that increase in insiders" holding has a negative effect on high-tech firm"s information transparency. Hence, the hypothesis H2 holds.
It is relatively easy for firm managers to manipulate information disclosure about R&D activities. Therefore, firms in high-tech industries with increase in insiders" shareholdings are associated with a downgrade in information transparency, no matter at what level of R&D activities. In considering the three types of information disclosures (strategic, nonfinancial, financial), the importance of the factors varies by information type (Meek et al., 1995) . Therefore, the attributes of R&D information are different among industries. As compared above, the signal and opportunistic role of R&D information may give firm managers an incentive to enhance their disclosure level. Because R&D activities of traditional industries are relatively rare and lower technique threshold, higher insiders" shareholdings may represent a motivation of enhancing the R&D-related disclosure to market new products or stimulate their sales (e.g. Czarnitzki and Thorwarth, 2012) .
Conclusion and Limitation
Through the regression analysis, we first perform hypothesis regressions on technology intensities that affect information transparency and find that higher technology intensities have higher information transparency, especially in high-tech industries, which is consistent with the finding of prior studies on specific industries. We also find that high-tech firms with higher R&D intensity have lower information transparency than non-high-tech firms only in group of medium transparency grade, which is not examined in past studies.
We test the effect of technology intensities and corporate ownership on information transparency in order to explore the inconsistent inference by extant theories and empirical findings. Further regression revealed that high-tech firms experiencing increase in insiders" shareholdings downgrade information transparency more than at firms in other industries. Higher R&D intensity may increase insiders" shareholdings which may significantly upgrade information transparency in the traditional firms, relative to other industries.
The prior studies focus exclusively on specific industry and it is unclear whether their results can be generalized beyond their chosen industries. By using a comprehensive official information transparency evaluation system (IDTRS), we are the first to document the effects of technology intensities on accounting disclosure across a broader cross-section of industries (OECD).
There are two gaps in literatures on corporate governance. First, the proprietary information effect cannot explain the positive relations between technology and transparency among industries. Second, when internal shareholdings increase, some possible technology factors result in the difference of corporate transparency. Based on technology intensities and industries, the significance of this study is to narrow these two gaps in prior researches. Our findings moved the body of knowledge forward by verifying that industry-level technology and R&D intensity matters in firm"s information transparency. Consequently, the related theories have limitations on information transparency of firms in different industries. These contributions are not meant to criticize these prior researches. Rather, our data and methodologies simply allowed us to address questions that could not be addressed in these other papers.
The limitation of this study is that only about 40% of voluntary evaluation indicators are employed. Because more robust evidences are drawn from voluntary disclosure level, our results could be clues to existing review indicators for further modification. Enhancing information transparency to help control firm"s operation might be more exact and prompt so that the investors can be better informed and stakeholders" rights can be well protected. To this end, an increase in the proportion of knowledge-and technology-related and voluntary indicators by authorities and regulators can push a more effective evaluation of knowledgeand technology-based firms.
We also provide an insight for government regulators and corporate executives to strengthen the corporate governance and supervision mechanism. We analyze the technology factors of information transparency in industries and firms respectively. The findings can give firm managers more exact and prompt operations; and provide regulators a reference to improve in any likely increased disclosure regime. Consequently, through the evolution of supervision, we expect the rights of investors and stakeholders will be further well-protected.
Endnotes
1 Except some listed companies with inadequate data (firms are first listed or relisted per evaluation annum) or regulatory enquiries, all TWSE/OTC-listed companies were covered by IDTRS. Our sample firms are partitioned according to the "Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development" (OECD) "ISIC Rev. 3 Technology Intensities Definition: Classification of manufacturing industries into categories based on R&D intensities" (2011). 2 According to the provisions of Article 30 of the Taiwan Securities Exchange Act: listed companies apply new shares issuance for cash capital increase must provide detailed share issuance information and the company profile including the operation circumstances, financial statements, and auditor"s attestation. The prospectus must comply with the full disclosure principle. Similar provisions in the Tax Laws are applicable to investment tax credit. 3 The OECD methodology uses two indicators of technology intensity reflecting, to different degrees, "technology-producer" and "technology-user" aspects: (i) R&D expenditures divided by value added; (ii) R&D expenditures divided by production. Because our R&D measure is different from the OECD"s R&D, all the VIFs of variables are less than 10 in subsequent tests after winsorizing R&D intensity at 0.1%. Therefore, the relationships found in all hypothesis regressions are not spurious. 4 According to U.S. financial accounting standards, SFAS No. 2 and No 86, under the full expensing rule when incurred, R&D expenditures are not accounted in productive assets expenditures. 5 Our two equations also refer to the regression models of Covrig et al., (2007) . For simplicity of notation, subscript denoting firm "i" is omitted from variable notations throughout the paper; subscript denoting "/" represents "or". 6 We follow the methodology of Fan and Wong (2002) . They use "CV" to measure the level of divergence. The measure of CV is a ratio of cash-flow holding percentage to controlling ownership by firm"s ultimate owner. 7 The collateral of personal holdings is deducted from total shareholding. These collateral holdings exists is set as equity collateral. 8 According to the TEJ database, we define the internal positions as chairman of the board of directors, supervisors, chief executive officers (CEO), chief financial officers (CFO). 9 Based on five-rank scheme, "Upgrade" denotes the change in information transparency between time t-1 and time t. Therefore, it is equal to 1 if the firm upgrades in test year, or 0 otherwise.
